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Abstract—Due to the evolving nature of power systems and
the complicated coupling relationship of power devices, it has
been a great challenge to identify the contingencies that could
trigger cascading blackouts of power systems. This paper aims to
develop a universal approach for identifying the initial disruptive
contingencies that can result in the worst-case cascading failures
of power grids. The problem of contingency identification is
formulated in a unified mathematical framework, and it can
be solved by the Jacobian-Free Newton-Krylov (JFNK) method
in order to circumvent the Jacobian matrix and relieve the
computational burden. Finally, numerical simulations are carried
out to validate the proposed identification approach on the IEEE
118 Bus System.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, contingency identification,
power grids, JFNK method
I. INTRODUCTION
THE past decades have witnessed several large blackoutsin the world such as India Blackout (2012), US-Canada
Blackout (2003), Italy Blackout (2003) and Southern Brazil
Blackout (1999) to name just a few, which have left millions
of residents without power supply and caused huge financial
losses [1]. In such catastrophe events, the initial contingencies
(e.g. extreme weather, terrorist attack and operator error) play
a crucial role in triggering the cascading outage of power
systems. It is reported that the mal-operation of a protection
relay is the key “trigger” of the final line outage sequence in
most blackouts [2]. For instance, conventional relays may lead
to unselective tripping under high load conditions, which could
initiate the chain reaction of branch outages under certain
conditions (e.g., a wrong relay operation of Sammis-Star line
in the 2003 US-Canada Blackout [2]). The reliability and
resilience of power grids are closely related to the proactive
elimination of disruptive initial contingencies. Thus, it is vital
to identify the initial contingency that causes the most severe
blackouts and work out remedial schemes against cascading
blackouts in advance.
In practice, electrical power devices such as FACTS devices,
HVDC links and protective relays serve as the major protective
barrier against cascading blackouts. To be specific, FACTS
devices significantly contribute to the stability improvement
of power systems, while HVDC links behave like a “firewall”
to prevent the propagation of cascading outages. Actually,
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the FACTS devices have been widely installed in power
transmission networks to improve the capability of power
transmission, controllability of power flow, damping of power
oscillation and post-contingency stability. As a series FACTS
device, the thyristor-controlled series capacitor (TCSC) allows
fast and continuous adjustments of branch impedance in order
to control the power flow and improve the transient stability
[3]. In addition, the HVDC links assist in preventing cascades
propagation and restoring the power flow after faults. For ex-
ample, Que´bec power system in Canada survived the cascades
in the 2003 US-Canada Blackout due to its DC interconnection
to the US power systems [2]. As the most common protection
device, protective relays of power system react passively to
the system oscillation and promptly remove the overloading
elements without affecting the normal operation of the rest of
the system. Meanwhile it allows for time delay of abnormal
oscillations to neglect the trivial disturbances and avoid the
overreaction to the transient state changes [4]. It is necessary to
take into account the protection mechanism of power devices
for the practical cascading process.
So far, cascading failures of power systems have been
investigated through two distinct routes. Specifically, some
researchers propose rigorous mathematical formulations for
exploring vulnerable elements or contingencies in power grids
[11], [13], while others focus on the accurate modeling of prac-
tical cascading failures [4], [12]. The identification approaches
are developed to search for critical branches or initial mali-
cious disturbances that can cause the large-scale disruptions
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [16]. For instance, the methods
are proposed to identify the collections of n−k contingencies
based on the event trees [5], line outage distribution factor [6]
and other optimization techniques [7], [8], [9]. Nevertheless,
these optimization approaches are not efficient to identify the
large collections of n−k contingencies that result in cascading
blackouts. To address this problem, a “random chemistry”
algorithm is designed with the relatively low computational
complexity [10]. In addition, an optimal control approach is
adopted to identify the initial contingencies by treating these
contingencies as the control inputs [16]. And this approach is
able to determine the continuous changes of branch admittance
other than direct branch outages as the initial contingencies.
An adaptive algorithm based on multi-agent system is designed
to prevent cascading failures of power grids subject to N−1
or N− 1− 1 contingencies without load shedding [17]. It is
suggested that the structural characteristic of communication
networks and the interaction between power grids and com-
munication networks are closely related to the ability of power
grids to prevent the cascades [18].
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2This work aims at a rigorous mathematical formulation
of identifying the worst-case cascading failures, which is
expected to allow for the practical physical characteristics of
power system cascades. Compared to existing work, the key
contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows
1) Propose a general mathematical formulation for identify-
ing the various contingencies that can trigger the power
system cascades and result in the severe disruptions.
2) Develop an efficient numerical algorithm based on the
Jacobian-Free Newton-Krylov method to search for the
critical contingencies with the guaranteed performance
in theory.
3) Validate the proposed approach on a large-scale power
grid and investigate the effect of time delay in protective
relays on the cascading failures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the cascades model and optimization formulation,
followed by the numerical solver and theoretical analysis in
Section III. Next, the identification approach is validated in
Section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss future
work in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Cascades Process
This section aims to characterize the cascading failure of
power grids subject to the initial contingency and system
stresses. Figure 1 presents the cascading process of power
grids after the initial contingency or triggering event is added
on the system. Specifically, the initial contingency or trigger-
ing event may result in the independent branch outages, which
could cause hidden failures in power grids or situational aware-
ness errors of operators in the control center. As a result, the
stresses in power networks are aggravated by hidden failures,
mis-operations of operators or the independent branch outages
directly. Such stresses may give rise to dependent branch
outages further and thus force power systems to take protective
actions (e.g., load shedding or generator tripping). Moreover,
the branch outages change the configuration of power networks
(i.e., network topology), which in return aggravates the stress
of power networks. Essentially, the above positive feedback
process contributes to accelerating the cascading failures and
ends up with the power systems blackout.
B. Mathematical model
In terms of the practical cascades process, it is suggested
that dynamic power networks can be modeled as a system of
hybrid differential-algebraic equations [4]. x˙ = f (t,x,y,θ)0 = g(t,x,y,θ)0 > h(t,x,y,θ) (1)
where x denotes a vector of continuous state variables subject
to differential relationships, and y represents a vector of
continuous state variables under the constraints of algebraic
equations. In addition, θ refers to a vector of discrete bi-
nary state variables (i.e., θi ∈ {0,1}). The set of differential
equations in the system (1) characterize the dynamic response
Fig. 1: Cascading failure process of power grids [14].
of machines, governors, exciters and loads in power grids.
The algebraic components mainly describe the AC power
flow equations, and the inequality terms reflect the discrete
events (e.g., the automatic line tripping by protective relays,
manual operations, lightning, etc) during cascading failures. In
practice, the structure of power grids (e.g., network topology,
component parameters) is affected once a discrete event oc-
curs. Thus, the discrete events directly influence the dynamic
response of relevant devices and the distribution of power flow
in power grids. To incorporate the effect of discrete events
at time instants tk, the time axis is divided into a series of
time intervals [tk−1, tk), k ∈ Im = {1,2, ...,m}. At each time
interval, the set of differential-algebraic equations is solved
using the updated parameters and initial conditions of power
system model due to discrete events. By solving the system
(1) in each time interval, the vectors of state variables x and y
at the terminal of each time interval can be obtained as follows{
xk = F(tk,xk−1,yk−1,θk−1)
yk = G(tk,xk−1,yk−1,θk−1)
(2)
where xk = x(tk), yk = y(tk) and θk = θ(tk), k ∈ Im. And the
iterated functions F and G describe the evolution process of
state variables xk and yk, respectively.
C. Optimization formulation
The cascading blackouts result in the severe damage of
power networks and paralyze the service of power supply.
Our goal is to search for the initial contingencies that cause
the worst disruptions of power grids at the end of cascading
blackouts. Therefore, the problem of identifying initial contin-
gencies in power grids is formulated as
min
δ∈Ω
J(δ ,xm,ym)
s. t. xk = F(tk,xk−1,yk−1,θk−1)
yk = G(tk,xk−1,yk−1,θk−1), k ∈ Im
(3)
where δ denotes the initial contingencies in power grids
that change the state variables x, y or z in the initial time
interval [t0, t1). And Ω represents the set of physical con-
straints on the initial contingencies, and it can be described as⋂n
i=1{δ | vi(δ )≤ 0} with the inequality constraints vi(δ )≤ 0.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the triggering event or
3initial contingency occurs at time τ ∈ [t0, t1). Then we have
(x(τ+),y(τ+),θ(τ+)) = Γ(x(τ),y(τ),θ(τ),δ ), and the func-
tion Γ characterizes the effect of the contingency δ on the
state variables at time τ .
The objective function J(δ ,xm,ym) quantifies the disruptive
level of power grids at the end of cascading failures. A
smaller value of J(δ ,xm,ym) indicates a worse disruption of
power grids due to cascading blackouts. Then it follows from
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions that the necessary
conditions for optimal solutions to Optimization Problem (3)
is presented as follows [22].
Proposition II.1. The optimal solution δ ∗ to Optimization
Problem (3) with the multipliers µi, i ∈ In satisfies the KKT
conditions
∇J(δ ∗,xm,ym)+
n
∑
i=1
µi∇vi(δ ∗) = 0
vi(δ ∗)+ω2i = 0
µi · vi(δ ∗) = 0
µi−σ2i = 0, i ∈ In
(4)
where ωi and σi, i ∈ In are the unknown variables.
Proof. The KKT conditions for Optimization Problem (3) are
composed of four components: stationary, primal feasibility,
dual feasibility and complementary slackness. Specifically,
stationary condition allows us to obtain
∇J(δ ∗,xm,ym)+
n
∑
i=1
µi∇vi(δ ∗) = 0,
where
Ω=
n⋂
i=1
{δ | vi(δ )≤ 0}.
Moreover, the primal feasibility leads to gi(δ ) ≤ 0, i ∈ In,
which can be converted into equality constraints
vi(δ ∗)+ω2i = 0, i ∈ In
with the unknown variables ωi ∈R. Further, the dual feasibility
corresponds to µi ≥ 0, which can be replaced by
µi−σ2i = 0, i ∈ In
with the unknown variables σi ∈R. Finally, the complementary
slackness gives
µi · vi(δ ∗) = 0, i ∈ In
This completes the proof.
Remark II.1. To reduce the computation burden, the gradient
∇J(δ ∗,xm,ym) can be approximated by
∇J(δ ,xm,ym)|δ=δ ∗ =
(
∂J(δ ,xm,ym)
∂δi
|δ=δ ∗
)
∈ Rdim(δ )
≈
(
J(δ ∗+ ε · ei,xm,ym)− J(δ ∗,xm,ym)
ε
)
(5)
with the sufficiently small ε and the unit vector ei with 1 in the
i-th position and 0 elsewhere. And the symbol dim(δ ) denotes
the dimension of the variable δ .
III. NUMERIC SOLVER
To avoid the computation of partial derivatives in (5), the
Jacobian Free Newton Krylov (JFNK) method is employed
in this section to solve the system of nonlinear algebraic
equations without computing the Jacobian matrix. Essentially,
the JFNK methods are synergistic combinations of Newton
methods for solving nonlinear equations and Krylov subspace
methods for solving linear equations [23]. To facilitate the
analysis, the system (4) is rewritten in matrix form
S(z) = 0, (6)
where the unknown vector z is composed of δ ∗, µi, ωi, σi,
i∈ In. And 0 refers to a zero vector with the proper dimension.
To obtain the iterative formula for solving (6), the Taylor series
of S(z) at zs+1 is computed as follows
S(zs+1) = S(zs)+J(zs)(zs+1− zs)+O(∆zs) (7)
with ∆zs = zs+1−zs. By neglecting the high-order term O(∆zs)
and setting S(zs+1) = 0, we obtain
J(zs) ·∆zs =−S(zs), s ∈ Z+ (8)
where J(zs) represents the Jacobian matrix and s denotes the
iteration index. Thus, solutions to Equation (6) can be approx-
imated by implementing Newton iterations zs+1 = zs + ∆zs,
where ∆zs is obtained by Krylov methods. First of all, the
Krylov subspace is constructed as follows
Ki = span
(
rs, J(zs)rs, J(zs)2rs, ..., J(zs)i−1rs
)
(9)
with rs =−S(zs)−J(zs) ·∆zs0, where ∆zs0 is the initial guess for
the Newton correction and is typically zero [23]. Actually, the
optimal solution to ∆zs is the linear combination of elements
in Krylov subspace Ki.
∆zs = ∆zs0+
i−1
∑
j=1
λ j ·J(zs) jrs, (10)
where λ j, j ∈ {1,2, ..., i− 1} is obtained by minimizing the
residual rs with the Generalized Minimal RESidual (GMRES)
method with the constraint of step size ‖∆zs‖ ≤ c [24]. In
particular, matrix-vector products in (10) can be approximated
by
J(zs)rs ≈ S(z
s+ ε · rs)−S(zs)
ε
, (11)
where ε is a sufficiently small value [25]. In this way,
the computation of Jacobian matrix is avoided via matrix-
vector products in (11) while solving Equation (6). Actually,
the accuracy of the forward difference scheme (11) can be
estimated as follows.
Proposition III.1.∥∥∥∥S(zs+ ε · rs)−S(zs)ε −J(zs)rs
∥∥∥∥≤ ε‖rs‖22 supt∈[0,1]‖S(2)(zs+tε ·rs)‖
where S(2)(z) denotes the second order derivative of S(z) with
respect to the variable z.
Proof. It follows from NR 3.3-3 in [26] that
S(zs+ ε · rs)−S(zs)
ε
−J(zs)rs =
∫ 1
0
ε(1−t)S(2)(zs+tε ·rs)rsrsdt
4TABLE I: Contingency Identification Algorithm.
Initialize: lmax, εmin, ε0, and δ = 0
Goal: δ ∗ and J(δ ∗,xm,ym)
1: for l = 0 to lmax
2: s = 0
3: while (εs > εmin)
4: Calculate the residual rs =−S(zs)−J(zs) ·∆zs0
5: Construct the Krylov subspace Ki in (9)
6: Approximate J(zs) jrs in (10) using (11)
7: Compute λ j in (10) with the GMRES method
8: Compute ∆zs with (10)
9: zs+1 = zs +∆zs
10: εs+1 = ‖∆zs‖/‖zs‖
11: s = s+1
12: end while
13: Update δ ∗ and J(δ ∗,xm,ym)
14: if (J(δ ∗,xm,ym)< J(δ ,xm,ym))
15: δ = δ ∗
16: end if
17: l = l+1
18: end for
which implies∥∥∥∥S(zs+ ε · rs)−S(zs)ε −J(zs)rs
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∫ 10 ε(1− t)S(2)(zs+ tε · rs)rsrsdt
∥∥∥∥
≤ ε
∫ 1
0
(1− t)
∥∥∥S(2)(zs+ tε · rs)rsrs∥∥∥dt
≤ ε
∫ 1
0
(1− t)‖S(2)(zs+ tε · rs)‖ · ‖rs‖2dt
≤ ε sup
t∈[0,1]
‖S(2)(zs+ tε · rs)‖ · ‖rs‖2
∫ 1
0
(1− t)dt
=
ε
2
‖rs‖2 · sup
t∈[0,1]
‖S(2)(zs+ tε · rs)‖
The proof is thus completed.
Remark III.1. The choice of ε greatly affects the accuracy
and robustness of the JFNK method. For the forward difference
scheme (11), ε can be set equal to a value larger than the
square root of machine epsilon to minimize the approximation
error [27].
Table I presents the implementation process of Contingency
Identification Algorithm (CIA) with the aid of the JFNK
method. First of all, the initial values for some variables are
specified as follow: δ = 0 and l = 0, εmin, ε0 with the condition
εmin < ε0, and the maximum iterative step lmax. Then the JFNK
method is employed to obtain the optimal disturbance δ ∗ and
the cost J(δ ∗,xm,ym) from Step 4 to Step 13. Specifically, the
residual rs is calculated in each iteration in order to construct
the Krylov subspace Ki. For elements in Ki, the matrix-vector
products are approximated by Equation (11) without forming
the Jacobian. Next, the term ∆zs for Newton iterations is
obtained via the GMRES method. The tolerance εs and step
number s are updated after implementing the Newton iteration
for zs. Afterwards, a new iteration loop is launched if the
termination condition εs ≤ εmin fails. After adopting the JFNK
method, a disturbance value δ ∗ in (4) is saved if it results in
a worse cascading failure (i.e., J(δ ∗,xm,ym) < J(δ ,xm,ym)).
The above algorithm does not terminate until the maximum
iterative step lmax is reached.
The following theoretical results allow us to roughly esti-
mate the convergence accuracy of initial disturbances before
implementing the CIA.
Proposition III.2. With the Contingency Identification Algo-
rithm in Table I, the increment ∆δ is upper bounded by
‖∆δ‖ ≤ εmin ·
(‖z0‖+ c · smax)
where z0 denotes the initial value for the unknown vector z
in the numerical algorithm, and smax refers to the maximum
iteration steps.
Proof. According to the Contingency Identification Algorithm,
we have the following inequality
‖∆zs‖
‖zs‖ ≤ εmin
after adopting the JFNK method. In addition, it follows from
the updating law zs+1 = zs+∆zs that zs = z0+∑s−1i=0 ∆z
i, which
allows us to obtain
‖∆zs‖ ≤ εmin · ‖zs‖
= εmin ·
∥∥∥∥∥z0+ s−1∑i=0∆zi
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ εmin ·
(
‖z0‖+
s−1
∑
i=0
‖∆zi‖
)
≤ εmin ·
(‖z0‖+ c · smax) ,
due to ‖∆zs‖ ≤ c and s ≤ smax. Moreover, it follows from
‖∆δ‖ ≤ ‖∆zs‖ that we have
‖∆δ‖ ≤ εmin ·
(‖z0‖+ c · smax) ,
which completes the proof.
Remark III.2. According to the CIA in Table I, the value
of cost function J(δ ∗,xm,ym) decreases monotonically as the
iteration step lmax increases. Considering that J(δ ∗,xm,ym) is
normally designed to have a lower bound (i.e., J(δ ∗,xm,ym)≥
0), J(δ ∗,xm,ym) converges to a local minimum. This enables
us to identify the corresponding initial disturbances δ ∗.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, the proposed CIA in Table I is implemented
to search for the disruptive disturbances on selected branches
of IEEE 118 Bus System [28]. Numerical results on disruptive
disturbances are validated by disturbing the selected branch
with the magnitude of disturbance identified by the CIA.
A. Cascades model
In the simulations, a simple cascades model is taken into
account and it includes FACTS devices, HVDC links and
protective relays. The mathematical descriptions of these com-
ponents are presented in the Appendix. In addition, the DC
power flow equation is employed to ensure the computational
efficiency and avoid the numerical non-convergence [4]. When
5power grids are subject to the malicious disturbances, the
FACTS devices take effect to adjust the branch admittance
and balance the power flow for relieving the stress of power
networks. If the stress is not eliminated, protective relays
will be activated to serve the overloading branches on the
condition that the timer of circuit breakers runs out of the
preset time. The outage of overloading branches may result
in the severer stress of power transmission networks and
end up with the cascading blackout. The evolution time of
cascading failure is introduced to allow for the time factor of
cascading blackouts. Essentially, the time interval between two
consecutive cascading steps basically depends on the preset
time of the timer in protective relays [4]. Thus, the evolution
time of cascading failure is roughly estimated by t = kT at the
k-th cascading step.
B. Parameter setting
Per-unit system is adopted with the base value of 100 MVA
in numerical simulations, and the power flow threshold for
each branch is 5% larger than the normal power floe on each
branch without any disturbances. The power flow on each
branch is close to the saturation, although it does not exceed
their respective thresholds. In this way, the power system
is vulnerable to initial contingencies, and thus is likely to
suffer from cascading blackouts. The cost function in (3) is
designed as ‖Pe(δ ,Pm,Y mp )‖2 to minimize the total power flow
on branches by identifying the initial disturbance δ . Here Pe
represents the vector of power flow on branches. Pm and Y mp
denote the vector of injected power on buses and that of branch
admittance at the end of cascading failure, respectively. The
maximum iterative step lmax is equal to 10 in the CIA. Other
parameters are given as follows: ε = 10−2 in Equation (5),
εmin = 10−8 in the JFNK method. Branch 8 (i.e., the red link
connecting Bus 5 to Bus 8 in Fig. 2) is randomly selected
as the disturbed element of power transmission networks. The
lower and upper bounds of initial disturbances on Branch 8
are given by δ = 0 and δ¯ = 37.45, respectively. Actually, the
upper bound of initial disturbances directly leads to the branch
outage. And the total number of cascading steps is m= 12. For
simplicity, we specify the same values for the parameters of
three HVDC links as follows: Rci = Rcr = RL = 0.1, α = pi/15
and γ = pi/4. Regarding the FACTS devices, we set Xmin,i = 0,
Xmax,i = 10 and X∗i = 0 for the TCSC, and KP = 4, KI = 3 and
KD = 2 for the PID controller. In addition, the reference power
flow P∗e,i is equal to the threshold of power flow on the relevant
branch.
C. Simulation and validation
Figure 2 shows the initial state of IEEE 118 Bus System
in the normal condition, and this power system includes 53
generator buses, 64 load buses, 1 reference bus (i.e., Bus
69) and 186 branches. And the HVDC links are denoted by
blue lines, which include Branch 4 connecting Bus 3 to Bus
5, Branch 16 connecting Bus 11 to Bus 13 and Branch 38
connecting Bus 26 to Bus 30. Two preset values of the timer
are taken into consideration in protective relays, i.e., T = 0.5s
and T = 1s. Contingency Identification Algorithm is carried
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Fig. 2: Initial state of IEEE 118 Bus System. Red balls
denote the generator buses, while blue ones stand for the load
buses. Cyan lines represent the branches of power systems.
In addition, the red line is selected as the disturbed branch,
and three blue lines are the HVDC links, including Branch 4,
Branch 16 and Branch 38.
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Fig. 3: Final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus System without
FACTS devices.
out to search for the disturbance that results in the worst-case
cascading failures of power systems (i.e., the minimum value
of cost function ‖Pe(δ ,Pm,Y mp )‖2). For the IEEE 118 Bus
System without the FACTS devices, the computed magnitude
of disturbance on Branch 8 is 37.45, which exactly leads
to the outage of Branch 8. For the power system with the
FACTS devices and the preset time of the timer T = 0.5s, the
disturbance magnitude identified by the CIA is 36.77, while
it is 35.98 for T = 1s.
Next, we validate the proposed identification approach by
adding the computed disturbances on Branch 8 of IEEE 118
Bus Systems. Specifically, Figure 3 demonstrates the final state
of IEEE 118 Bus System with no FACTS devices and with the
preset time of circuit breaker T = 1s. The cascading process
terminates with 95 outage branches and the value of cost
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Fig. 4: Final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus System with
FACTS devices and T = 0.5s.
function is 53.28 after 16 seconds, and the system collapses
with 42 islands in the end. These 42 islands include 24 isolated
buses and 18 subnetworks encircled by the dashed lines. In
contrast, Figure 4 presents the final configuration of IEEE 118
Bus Systems with the protection of the FACTS devices and
with the preset time T = 0.5s. The cascading process ends
up with 40 outage branches and the value of cost function is
102.56 after 10 seconds, and the power system is separated
into 17 islands, which include 6 subnetworks and 11 isolated
buses. Figure 5 gives the final state of power systems with
FACTS devices and T = 1s. It is observed that the power
network is eventually split into 3 islands (Bus 14, Bus 16 and
a subnetwork composed of all other buses) with only 6 outage
branches and the cost function of 153.69. Note that the initial
disturbances identified by the CIA fail to cause the outage of
Branch 8 in the end for both T = 0.5s and T = 1s. The above
simulation results demonstrate the advantage of the FACTS
devices in preventing the propagation of cascading outages.
A larger preset time of timer enables the FACTS devices to
sufficiently adjust the branch admittance in response to the
overload stress. As a result, the less severe damages are caused
by the contingency for the larger preset time of timer.
Figure 6 presents the time evolution of branch outages in
the IEEE 118 Bus System as a result of disturbing Branch
8 in three different scenarios. The cyan squares denote the
number of outage branches with no FACTS devices and T =
1s, while the green and blue ones refer to the numbers of
outage branches with the FACTS devices and with T = 0.5s
and T = 1s, respectively. The disturbances identified by the
CIA are added to change the admittance of Branch 8 at t = 0s.
With no FACTS devices, the cascading outage of branches
propagates quickly from t = 2s to t = 10s and terminates at
t = 16s. When the FACTS devices are adopted and the preset
time of timer is T = 0.5s, the cascading failure starts at t =
2s and speeds up till t = 8s and stops at t = 10s. For T =
1s, the cascading outage propagates slowly due to the larger
preset time of timer and comes to an end with only 6 outage
branches at t = 8s. Together with protective relays and HVDC
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Fig. 5: Final configuration of IEEE 118 Bus System with
FACTS devices and T = 1s.
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Fig. 6: Time evolution of outage branches during cascading
blackouts.
links, the FACTS devices succeed in protecting power systems
against blackouts by adjusting the branch impedance in real
time. More precisely, the number of outage branches decreases
by 57.9% with FACTS devices and T = 0.5s and decreases by
93.7% with FACTS devices and T = 1s.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of identifying
the initial contingencies that lead to cascading blackout of
power transmission networks equipped with FACTS devices,
HVDC links and protective relays. A universal optimization
formulation was proposed to identify the contingencies, and
an efficient numerical method was presented to solve the
optimization problem. Numerical simulations were carried out
on the IEEE 118 Bus Systems to validate the proposed iden-
tification approach. Significantly, the proposed contingency
identification algorithm allows us to detect some nontrivial
disturbances that lead to the severe cascading failure of power
7transmission networks, other than directly severing the branch.
It is demonstrated that the coordination of FACTS devices and
protective relays greatly enhances the capability of power grids
against blackouts. Future work may include the comparison of
different cascades models and the validation of the identified
disturbances with real data in power system blackouts.
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APPENDIX: COMPONENT MODELS
A. FACTS devices
FACTS devices can greatly enhance the stability and trans-
mission capability of power systems. As an effective FACTS
device, TCSC has been widely installed to control the branch
impedance and relieve system stresses. The dynamics of TCSC
is described by a first order dynamical model [19]
TC,i
dXC,i
dt
=−XC,i+X∗i +ui, Xmin,i ≤ XC,i ≤ Xmax,i (12)
where X∗i refers to its reference reactance of Branch i for
the steady power flow. Xmin,i and Xmax,i are the lower and
upper bounds of the branch reactance XC,i respectively and ui
represents the supplementary control input, which is designed
to stabilize the disturbed power system [20]. For simplicity,
PID controller is adopted to regulate the power flow on each
branch
ui(t) = KP · ei(t)+KI ·
∫ t
0
ei(τ)dτ+KD · dei(t)dt (13)
where KP, KI and KD are tunable coefficients, and the error
ei(t) is given by
ei(t) =
{
P∗e,i−|Pe,i(t)|, |Pe,i(t)| ≥ P∗e,i;
0, otherwise.
Here, P∗e,i and Pe,i(t) denote the reference power flow and the
actual power flow on Branch i, respectively. Note that TCSC
fails to function when the transmission line is severed.
B. HVDC links
HVDC links work as a protective barrier to prevent the
propagation of cascading outages in practice, and it is normally
composed of a transformer, a rectifier, a DC line and an
inverter. Actually, the rectifier terminal can be regarded as
a bus with real power consumption Pr, while the inverter
terminal can be treated as a bus with real power generation Pi.
The direct current from the rectifier to the inverter is computed
as follows [21]
Id =
3
√
3(cosα− cosγ)
pi(Rcr +RL−Rci) ,
where α ∈ [pi/30,pi/2] denotes the ignition delay angle of
the rectifier, and γ ∈ [pi/12,pi/9] represents the extinction
advance angle of the inverter. Rcr and Rci refer to the equiv-
alent communicating resistances for the rectifier and inverter,
respectively. Additionally, RL denotes the resistance of the DC
transmission line. Thus the power consumption at the rectifier
terminal is
Pr =
3
√
3
pi
Id cosα−RcrI2d , (14)
and at the inverter terminal is
Pi =
3
√
3
pi
Id cosγ−RciI2d = Pr−RLI2d . (15)
Note that Pr and Pi keep unchanged when α and γ are fixed.
C. Protective relay
The protective relays are indispensable components in
power systems protection and control. When the power flow
exceeds the given threshold of the branch, the timer of circuit
breaker starts to count down from the preset time [4]. Once
the timer runs out of the preset time, the transmission line is
severed by circuit breakers and its branch admittance becomes
zero. Specifically, a step function is designed to reflect the
physical characteristics of branch outage as follows
g(Pe,i,σi) =
{
0, |Pe,i|> σi and tc > T ;
1, otherwise.
where T is the preset time of the timer in protective relays,
and tc denotes the counting time of the timer. In addition, Pe,i
denotes the power flow on Branch i with the threshold σi.
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